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Abstract
The authors present a dataset that contains the positions of 231 political parties across 
28 countries on 30 policy issues that were considered salient for the 2014 elections to 
the European Parliament. The party position estimates were originally used in a voter 
information tool which compared the policy preferences of citizens to those of politi-
cal parties. The paper discusses the estimation method in the context of the literature 
on estimating party positions, outlines the coding methodology, and introduces the 
value of the dataset for third-party users interested in studying political participation 
and representation.
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– Related data set “Political parties’ policy positions for the 2014 elections to the 
European Parliament” with doi http://doi.org/10.7802/1594 in repository “gesis 
datorium”. 
1. Introduction
Voting Advice Applications (vaas) are contemporary technological solutions 
that aim to compare the positions of voters to the positions of candidates or 
political parties on a set of relevant policy issues and informing voters about 
how well their preferences match those of the parties or candidates.
Government-funded bodies originally developed vaas as civic education 
tools with the intention of enhancing political knowledge and increasing 
electoral participation. The most popular vaa in the Netherlands, StemWijzer, 
was first developed in 1989 as an educational tool for high schools. Since the 
early 2000s, StemWijzer has served as a blueprint for many other vaas, such 
as Wahl-O-Mat in Germany, as well being the precursor to other types of vaa 
designs, such as those of the Swiss-based Smartvote. The rise of the internet 
brought with it an ever-increasing number of users while also fuelling the 
spread of vaas across Europe. vaas have now become a more prominent and 
generalized feature of the European political landscape, often attracting mil-
lions of users during electoral contests in larger European countries (Garzia & 
Marschall, 2014).
In a similar way as for national elections, vaas have been fielded during 
elections for the European Parliament. The decreasing levels of voter turn-
out in such elections have long alarmed those who hoped that the increase 
in the European Parliament’s powers under the co-decision procedure could 
dampen the indifference towards or disaffection with the European Union. 
Research has often indicated that vaa use during national election campaigns 
may boost turnout (Marschall & Schultze, 2012; Gemenis & Rosema, 2014; Garzia, 
Trechsel, & De Angelis, 2017; Germann & Gemenis, 2019), so it comes as no 
surprise that the 2014 elections to the European Parliament saw a proliferation 
of voter information tools such as VoteMatch Europe (http://www.votematch.
eu/), EUandI (http://euandi.eu/), EUvox (http://www.euvox2014.eu/), and Elec-
tio2014 (http://www.votewatch.eu/electio/). Starting with EU Profiler in 2009, 
most vaas that were implemented at the supranational level (like the afore-
mentioned tools) have allowed citizens to compare their policy preferences to 
those of political parties not only in their country of residence but in other EU 
member states as well. The central assumption of such vaas, however, is that 
the positions of these parties can be estimated with considerable certainty. If 
they cannot, vaas would provide citizens with misleading information.
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In an attempt to contribute to the extensive academic debate on this sub-
ject (see Mair, 2001; Volkens, 2007; Laver, 2014), this paper describes the pro-
cedures and methods used to estimate party policy positions in the context 
of the EUvox vaa and presents the resulting database, which can be used by 
third-party researchers to investigate questions of broader interest in political 
science.
2. Research Problem
One of the biggest methodological challenges in the design of vaas and voter 
information tools in general is to find an unbiased and reliable method of esti-
mating the positions of political parties on the policy statements that are used 
to match voters to parties. For several decades, the primary reference source 
for party policy preferences was based on the laborious hand-coding of par-
ty manifestos using methods and codebooks developed in the 1970s (Budge, 
Klingemann, Volkens, Bara, & Tanenbaum, 2001). Such hand-coding, however, 
has been shown to be unreliable against conventional content analysis stan-
dards (see Mikhaylov, Laver, & Benoit, 2012; Gemenis, 2013a).
The advent of the internet brought with it a plethora of political documents 
in machine-readable format. Political scientists can now pre-process such doc-
uments and use them to estimate “quantities of interest” (Grimmer & Stewart, 
2013). Supervised machine-learning algorithms appear to be particularly prom-
ising with regard to coding party manifestos. However, the outcomes of super-
vised machine learning to classify the content of party manifestos only mod-
erately correspond to those by human coding (Bilbao-Jayo & Almeida, 2018; 
Wiedeman, 2018). Moreover, the applications are concerned with pre-defined 
policy categories that indicate the relative emphasis parties place on different 
issues instead of their expressed position on issues which is of interest in vaas.
In contrast, the supervised computational scaling methods (Grimmer & 
Stewart, 2013, pp. 291–292) have been shown to lack validity, especially with 
regard to estimating positions on specific policy statements employed in vaas 
(Bruinsma & Gemenis, forthcoming; Ruedin & Morales, 2017). Despite their 
promise, automated text analysis methods have not become a standard tool 
in political analysis due to the lack of rigorous studies demonstrating their 
 widespread validity (Grimmer & Stewart, 2013). Moreover, the automated text 
analysis algorithms are not directly accessible or easily understandable by 
 users, which makes the use of such automated methods problematic in terms 
of the standards set by vaa designers (e.g. the Lausanne Declaration on vaas: 
Garzia & Marschall, 2014).
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For these reasons, the vaas operated by government-funded bodies rely on 
direct input from the parties or candidates, while the vaas that are designed 
by political scientists rely on estimates given by other political scientists in 
 so-called ‘expert surveys’ (Gemenis & Van Ham, 2014). The latter, however, have 
been criticized in terms of ideological bias, as experts have their own political 
preferences (Curini, 2010), and in terms of reliability, as experts often disagree 
with one another (Lindstädt, Proksch, & Slapin, 2018).
To address the problem of subjectiveness and unreliability in  estimating 
 parties’ positions on a wide variety of policy issues across EU member states, 
EUvox used an approach best described as an ‘iterative expert survey’ ( Gemenis, 
2015). The approach consists of an interactive forecasting technique that relies 
on the anonymous deliberations of a panel of coders and controlled feedback 
between multiple rounds of estimation, known as the Delphi method (Dalkey 
& Helmer, 1963). In many respects, this structured aggregation of responses has 
clear advantages over taking the mean (Steenbergen & Marks, 2007) or modal 
(Lindstädt, Proksch, & Slapin, 2018) response, or more sophisticated statistical 
aggregation approaches (Marquardt & Pemstein, 2018). A considerable body 
of evidence has shown that the Delphi method gives more accurate estimates 
compared to alternative methods (Rowe & Wright, 1999), and its application 
in estimating party policy positions has produced valid and reliable results 
( Gemenis, 2012; Gemenis & Van Ham, 2014). The premise of the Delphi method 
is that the iterative process induces coders to converge on an estimate by filter-
ing out biased and/or uninformed estimates. Anonymity plays a crucial role, as 
it guarantees that the consensus reached among the coders is due to the qual-
ity of information and not to the coders’ personalities or political preferences. 
To achieve this, EUvox employed a web-based system that allowed panellists 
to estimate party positions in an anonymous, distributed, and asynchronous 
manner (Djouvas & Gemenis, 2019).
3. Methods
For the 2014 elections to the European Parliament, party positions were coded 
on a set of 30 questions representing policy issues that were considered salient 
for each country. For each party, the goal was to assign five coders to com-
plete the task over at least two rounds of coding. In a few countries (Austria, 
Belgium/Flanders, France, Malta, Netherlands, Sweden), time constraints did 
not allow for a second round, while for a few parties the country teams of the 
project were unable to recruit five persons per party and the task was therefore 
carried out by fewer coders. Coding for EUvox took place on the SmartCoding 
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web platform, which was designed for use with the ‘iterative expert survey’ 
method as shown in Figure 1.
For each country, a separate instance of SmartCoding was initiated and the 
link to the instance was communicated along with the login details (username 
and password) to the moderator and coders of that particular country. The 
first time the coders entered the platform they answered a few personal back-
ground/demographic questions regarding their expertise. Once this informa-
tion had been entered, they were able to see the parties that had been assigned 
to them for coding. Coders were able to select any of the available parties and 
code each party with respect to each issue statement. An example of an issue 
statement is:
Bulgaria should join the Eurozone
Statements such as the above represent an opinion. Coders had to decide 
whether or not the relevant party agreed with this opinion. They therefore 
needed to make a judgement using documented sources, their own expertise, 
or other contextual information. They had a five-point response scale with a 
‘no opinion’ option for their judgement.
1. Completely agree;
2. Agree;
3. Neither agree nor disagree;
4. Disagree;
5. Completely disagree; or
6. No opinion.
Coders were asked to use the (6) ‘No opinion’ position for parties when the 
party’s position on the issue was not mentioned in, and could not be inferred 
from, any relevant sources. Coders were instructed that coding results should 
contain as few as possible ‘no opinion’ positions.
Positions (2) ‘Agree’ and (4) ‘Disagree’ were used when a party took sides on 
the issue. For example, in the above statement, position (2) should be used if the 
party agreed that Bulgaria should join the Eurozone, while (4) should be used 
if the party disagreed and believed that Bulgaria should not join the Eurozone.
Positions (1) ‘Completely agree’ and (5) ‘Completely disagree’ were used 
when a party strongly emphasized the issue and did not place any restrictions 
on or have any doubts about the validity of the issue. In the example given, 
(1) should therefore be used when the party appeared to express a strong and 
unambiguous opinion that Bulgaria should join the Eurozone, while (5) should 
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be used when that party expressed an equally strong and unambiguous posi-
tion that Bulgaria should not join the Eurozone.
Coders were also instructed that position (3) ‘Neither agree nor disagree’ 
was an argued position, unlike (6) ‘No opinion’. Position (3) was to be used 
either i) when the party only addressed an issue indirectly or vaguely and 
did not express an opinion clearly in favour or against; or ii) when the party 
clearly emphasized both sides of the issue (i.e. positive and negative aspects) 
and made a point of not taking sides; or iii) when a party was divided on an 
issue (i.e. equally prominent figures within the party took different sides of the 
argument).
Coders were instructed to reach their decisions on how to code each party 
on each statement anonymously and not to collaborate. In addition, they were 
asked to do all they could to be objective and not let their prejudices about cer-
tain parties get the better of them. For example, a coder who was sympathetic 
to pro-Euro party X should not code party Y ‘Disagree’ on whether Bulgaria 
should join the Eurozone based on a prejudice that party Y were pro-Russia 
communists who obviously opposed the Euro (even if they say they support 
it). If party Y’s leaders said that they wanted Bulgaria to join the Eurozone, the 
party must be coded accordingly.
In addition, coders were instructed to indicate how they arrived at their 
judgement in each case by entering some information in a box entitled ‘Jus-
tification’. Coders were told that they could make use of all possible sources 
of information on party positions (including manifestos, websites, news re-
ports, and press releases). EUvox did not employ a set ‘hierarchy of documents’ 
(cf. Garzia, Trechsel, & De Sio, 2017), which meant that the coders were free to 
decide where to source the most relevant information. When these sources 
proved to be insufficient or otherwise unavailable, coders were asked to make a 
personal judgement based on their expertise or other contextual information. 
They were told that the information provided in the ‘Justification’ box should 
help convince other coders during the next round of coding that the judge-
ment provided in that case was correct. Moreover, coders were instructed to 
provide the source of this evidence (e.g. a specific url, page number of party 
manifesto, etc.) in the box entitled ‘Source’.
Coders were also asked to indicate how confident they felt about their cod-
ing of a party for each statement. The options on a drop-down menu on the 
SmartCoding web platform were:
1. Very confident;
2. Somewhat confident;
3. Not confident at all.
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Once coding for the first round was completed, a moderator selected for 
each  country inspected the file with the aggregated results produced by 
the SmartCoding platform to check whether sufficient consensus had been 
reached among the panel. For each party/statement combination, Smart 
Coding had been programmed to export the median estimate as well as Van 
der Eijk’s A coefficient of agreement (Van der Eijk, 2001). Coefficient A ranges 
from 1 to -1, where 1 indicates perfect agreement among the coders and -1 indi-
cates polarization, with half of the coders placing the party at (1) ‘Completely 
agree’ and the other half at (5) ‘Completely disagree’. Moderators were asked 
to check for instances where A was under 0.7 and to review the individual re-
sponses in these party/statement pair. It appeared to be often the case that 
coders mistake the direction of the response scale. For example, two coders 
might give exactly the same source and justification, but one will code the 
party as (1) ‘Completely agree’ and the other as (5) ‘Completely disagree’. This 
probably means that one of the coders has mistaken the direction of the 1–5 
response scale that was given for the coding. Moderators were instructed that, 
in such cases, it was advisable to enter a comment under the justification given 
by the coder in question to point out this inconsistency. It was at the modera-
tor’s discretion to enter as many such comments on estimates/justifications 
given by coders as necessary. The moderators could therefore point out pos-
sible mistakes, inconsistencies, biases, and misunderstandings of the meaning 
of the question or the response scale.
The moderator then initiated a second round of coding, in which coders 
were able to see the estimates, justifications, and level of confidence given 
by each of the other anonymous coders, as well as the comments made by 
the moderator. In the second (and any subsequent) round, coders were asked 
to review their initial (first round) estimates in the light of the information 
(estimates, confidence, justifications, and sources) given by all other coders 
and of the (possible) comments given by the moderator. Also, in the second 
(and any subsequent) round, SmartCoding allowed coders to comment on 
estimates given in previous rounds, and to respond to comments left by the 
moderator. SmartCoding allows this process of moderation and iteration to be 
repeated over several rounds until sufficient consensus is reached. In EUvox, 
two and (rarely) three rounds were usually sufficient, although, as previously 
noted, in a handful of countries time constraints did not allow for coding of 
parties over more than one round. When coding for the parties in a particular 
country ended, the moderator was asked to arbitrate over any unresolved 
cases where agreement in specific party/statement pairs was below 0.7 in 
terms of Van der Eijk’s (2001) perceptual agreement coefficient, as well as 
in cases where the majority of coders gave a (3) ‘Neither agree nor disagree’ or 
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a (6) ‘No opinion’ position. To resolve these cases, moderators were instructed 
to take into account the justifications and levels of confidence given by the 
coders.
4. Data
– EUvox party positions dataset deposited at gesis – doi:http://doi.org/ 
10.7802/1594
– Temporal coverage: 2014
The EUvox party positions dataset, available from the German social science 
data archive, gesis (doi:10.7802/1594), contains two main files: the party posi-
tions file, and the questionnaire file. In the party positions file, each row repre-
sents a political party, with the columns giving the name of the party in English 
and the original language, the number of rounds and coders that were em-
ployed in coding the positions of this party, and the positions of the party on 
each of the 30 policy statements. Out of these 30 statements, 21 were common 
across all countries (see Appendix). Among the common questions, there were 
seven for each of three broad dimensions: economic ‘left‐right’, cultural ‘lib-
eral‐conservative’, based closely on the tan/gal scale proposed by the Chapel 
Hill Expert Survey team (Hooghe, Marks, & Wilson, 2002), and a pro/anti‐EU 
dimension. A notable exception to the common questions was the wording 
of the statement about the Euro, which differed between Eurozone and non-
Eurozone countries (see Appendix, Statement 1). Among the nine questions 
that differed among countries, some were common across several, but not all, 
countries. An example of such a statement was ‘Protecting the environment is 
more important than fostering economic growth’, which was given in Finland, 
Ireland, Germany, Italy, Spain, Poland, Hungary, Estonia, and Bulgaria, but not 
in other countries. Other questions were unique to a single country, such as ‘To 
combat unemployment, workers must accept signing individual contracts’, which 
was given only in Greece. The wording of all policy statements that were coded 
for each party can be found in the questionnaire file.
In total, the dataset contains the positions of 231 parties across 28 countries 
and on 30 policy issues, making it comparable to other major datasets in the 
field (e.g. the 2014 edition of the long-established Chapel Hill Expert Survey 
(http://www.chesdata.eu). Moreover, the use of multiple coders and, in most 
cases, multiple rounds of coding offers increased confidence in the reliability 
of the estimates compared to other datasets with a comparable breadth of 
coverage (cf. Garzia, Trechsel & De Sio, 2017).
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5. Concluding Remarks
Third-party users can employ the party position data offered in this dataset as 
is or scale the individual items into general dimensions of interest using data 
reduction techniques such as principal component analysis, multidimensional 
scaling, Mokken scale analysis, or Bayesian item response models ( Louwerse 
& Otjes, 2012; Gemenis, 2013b; Germann, Mendez, Wheatley, & Serdült, 2015; 
 Germann & Mendez, 2016; Linhart & Shikano, 2015; Dalton, 2016; Nyhuis & 
König, 2018) to study a wide variety of substantive questions in political science.
For instance, vaa data on party positions has been used to assess govern-
ment coalitions (Linhart & Shikano, 2015), polarization across policy issues 
(Wall & Williams, 2018), the dimensionality of political space (e.g. Katsanidou 
& Otjes, 2016; Garry, Matthews, & Wheatley, 2017; Nyhuis & König, 2018), con-
tinuity and change in parties’ ideological profiles (e.g. Dalton, 2016), and po-
litical representation (e.g. Rose & Borz, 2013), especially in combination with 
citizen data from election studies (e.g. Lefkofridi & Katsanidou, 2014). In addi-
tion, since vaas employ the same questionnaire for parties and citizens, vaa 
datasets on party positions can be combined with datasets of vaa users (e.g. 
Wheatley, 2015; Wheatley & Mendez, forthcoming) in order to measure elec-
toral utilities that can be used to test spatial models of voting (Mendez, 2017). 
Either way, vaa data on party positions offer unique opportunities to study 
political participation and representation beyond the vaa designers’ original 
intention of helping citizens make informed choices during elections.
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 Appendix
Table A1 Statements common to all countries in the EUvox dataset
# Dimension Statement
1 EU [Name of country] should exit the Euro (Eurozone countries) 
/ [Name of country] should never adopt the Euro (non-
Eurozone countries).
2 EU A single member state should be able to block a treaty change, 
even if all the other member states agree to it.
3 EU The right of EU citizens to work in [name of country] should 
be restricted.
4 EU There should be a common EU foreign policy even if this lim-
its the capacity of [name of country] to act independently.
5 EU The EU should redistribute resources from richer to poorer eu 
regions.
6 EU Overall, EU membership has been a bad thing for the [name of 
country].
7 EU EU treaties should be decided by [name of national 
parliament] rather than by citizens in a referendum.
8 Economic Free market competition makes the health care system 
function better.*
9 Economic The number of public sector employees should be reduced.
10 Economic The state should intervene as little as possible in the economy.
11 Economic Wealth should be redistributed from the richest people to the 
poorest.
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# Dimension Statement
12 Economic Cutting government spending is a good way to solve the 
economic crisis.
13 Economic It should be easy for companies to fire people
14 Economic External loans from institutions such as the imf are a good 
solution to crisis situations.
15 Cultural Immigrants must adapt to the values and culture of [name of 
country].
16 Cultural Restrictions on citizen privacy are acceptable in order to 
combat crime.
17 Cultural To maintain public order, governments should be able to 
restrict demonstrations.
18 Cultural Less serious crimes should be punished with community 
service, not imprisonment.
19 Cultural Same sex couples should enjoy the same rights as heterosexual 
couples to marry.
20 Cultural Women should be free to decide on matters of abortion.
21 Cultural The recreational use of cannabis should be legal.
Table A1 Statements common to all countries in the EUvox dataset (cont.)
* In France, the question wording was ‘Face au déficit de la sécurité sociale, les malades 
devraient les malades devraient payer une plus grande part de leurs dépenses médicaux’.
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